Security and regions.

Where your knowledge lives, how every request is limited, how each file is checked, and how a warrant is sealed so anyone can check it later.

Two planes

Your knowledge plane holds your content, the store, answers and warrants, in the region you choose. The discovery plane reaches the open web. Only instructions cross out; findings come back and are checked before they count.

The governed seamYour knowledge planeYour content, the store,answers and warrantsIn the region you choose.Sensitive content nevercrosses out.Discovery and search planeReaches the open webRuns in the cloud. Can bepinned to a jurisdiction orswitched off.instructions outfindings, checked

The discovery plane runs in the cloud. It can be pinned to a jurisdiction or switched off. The seam between the planes carries instructions out and checked findings back.

Access

Every caller goes through one governed API. It resolves the tenant and identity, applies the caller's scopes, and shows a preview before any change. The Corvair Knowledge Substrate names no caller: each application registers itself and its agents, and every request is limited to what that person or agent may see.

StepWhat happens
Tenant and identityThe API works out which tenant the request belongs to and who or what is calling.
ScopesThe caller's scopes decide which operations and which knowledge it may reach.
PreviewEvery change shows a preview first. A change is made only after that.
Same rules everywhereEach MCP tool forwards to its API route, so access rules apply once for every interface, including the command line.

Vault scan checks

The Vault holds the files people add and the files agents make. It scans each one before it can be used. Three checks decide whether a file may go on: malware, active content and file type. Any doubt keeps the file on hold, with the reason shown.

CheckWhat it looks for
MalwareA match against known malware signatures by a scanner that fails closed.
Active contentScripts, macros and injection patterns inside the file.
File typeThe real structure of the file, such as a binary format or media container.

A scanner outage, error, timeout or unclear result is not a pass. The file stays on hold, marked "scan unavailable", until it is scanned again. The engine and signature versions, the findings, the coverage and the times are recorded on the file.

Only a clean scan clears the hold. To release a held file, a caller with write access or an administrator previews the release and gives a reason, and the file is scanned again. Moving or renaming a file never changes its state.

Personal data is found and flagged, not held: the application that stored the file decides what to do with it.

Every version of a file is kept unchanged. Every read checks the file again, and content is served only through a short-lived grant for one version and one purpose.

Warrant trust material

A warrant is sealed in four steps: a fixed form, a signature, a timestamp and a link to the warrant before it. Three independent pieces of trust material stand behind the seal.

MaterialWhat it provesHow it is kept
Governance keyWho sealed the warrant.An ECDSA P-384 key generated in a key service and never exported. Only the signing service may use it. Rotation adds a new version, and old versions are kept so earlier warrants still check.
Timestamp authorityWhen the warrant existed.An RFC 3161 token over the signature, from a timestamp service with its own key in a separate key ring and a published certificate chain. The endpoint is configuration, so an independent authority can be used instead.
Published keysThat anyone can check the signature.The verification keys and their lifecycle are published at /.well-known/did.json, keys.json and corvair-governance-chain.pem.

The signing service is private and is the only identity allowed to use the governance key. Each warrant points to the one before it. A sequence number and the previous hash make any removal or reordering detectable, and a sweep job checks every chain end to end. A failure never returns a receipt for a warrant that does not exist.

How anyone checks a warrant

Seven mechanical checks need only the warrant, the published key and the timestamp chain. They are the same online and offline.

CheckWhat it confirms
1. RecanonicaliseThe record's bytes and digest match, and the sealed commitments recombine to the signed root.
2. SignatureThe signature is valid over those bytes.
3. Key validityThe key was valid, and not revoked, at the trusted time of signing.
4. TimestampThe timestamp token is valid over the signature, against a pinned trust anchor.
5. Transparency logCounted only when a transparency log is configured. It is defined but suspended today, so it is not part of the verdict.
6. Previous hashThe link to the prior warrant in its chain holds.
7. Source driftCited sources are fetched again and compared. A source that has changed is listed, and the warrant is not failed.

A warrant is valid when checks 1 to 4 and 6 pass, plus check 5 when a transparency log is configured. Online, the API returns each check separately. Offline, an exported bundle is checked by a standalone verifier that uses independently obtained keys and a pinned timestamp trust anchor. Keys inside the bundle are evidence, not trust anchors. An offline check cannot know of later revocations, supersessions or source erasure beyond the material supplied with it.

Sensitive parts of a warrant are sealed as commitments, so content can be erased and the warrant still checks. An erased part is reported as erased, not as a failure.

Connect your first assistant.